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Introduction  
 
Those crafting healthcare policies must struggle with the dire medical reality that 
nearly 22 people die every day while waiting for an organ transplant (USDHHS 2016). 
MacKay and Robinson’s (M&R) article addresses ethical questions raised by the ways 
different choice architectures present people with options concerning how they might help 
improve this situation by donating their own organs after they die. Their main conclusions 
are that all four choice architectures that they consider are pro tanto morally wrong, and that 
each fails, ultimately, because it does not respect the autonomy of those being presented 
with the choice.  
 
For the sake of a clean dialectic, we advance an argument we are tempted but not yet 
fully convinced by, or at least formulate our response in terms that are starker than we would 
otherwise. We take the conclusion that none of the four considered choice architectures is 
morally permissible to be unacceptable, and so interpret the argument that produced it as a 
reductio ad absurdum. Consequently, we attempt to identify which premise in the authors’ line 
of reasoning is the culprit that leads to the unacceptable conclusion. 
 
Coercion and Default Rules 
 
That none of the four options for asking people about organ donation js morally 
acceptable strikes us as implausible. While the final assessment as pro tanto morally deficient 
is uniform across all four options, their flaws divide them into two categories those that are 
putatively coercive and those that use a form of putatively reason-bypassing non-
argumentative influence. 
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The authors find fault in mandated active choice (MAC) options for being coercive. 
More specifically, they object to the fact that MACs “require” people “to register as organ 
donors or not” (20) and impose sanctions on those failing to meet this obligation (8). Here 
we think M&R overplay their hand. In general, categorizing as “coercion” the mere act of 
addressing someone with a question is a stretch of the intuitive concept. Describing MACs 
as also “forcing” (8, 22) people to choose between pre-established response options can 
lessen this impression, but we think even this description is misleading. After all, one doesn’t 
absolutely have to answer the question if one doesn’t want, e.g. on pain of incarceration or 
death. There is no forcing in this case, but rather a (to us, reasonable) tradeoff: one has the 
option to not answer, but exercising that option is not without consequences. One can 
refuse, and live without a driver’s license. That’s the price one pays; such is the way of 
society, life lived with the comforts and benefits of a social contract. Perhaps merely 
answering such questions carries some cost – though we do not share the libertarian flavored 
intuition the authors express (22), and would resist saying that the cost was a moral one. But 
describing as “coercion” the fact that claiming one privilege (e.g. getting a driver’s license) is 
conditional on merely having to answer a question extends the concept of coercion beyond 
its useful limits. 
 
Moving on to the other three nudges, M&R point out that voluntary active choice 
(VAC), opt-in, and opt-out varieties each employ a particular default rule that frames how 
questions and options about organ donation are put to people, and that specifies (often 
implicitly) what happens if people remain passive, making no active change to the frame. 
Policy makers like default rules because they have predictable influence over collective 
outcomes. At the individual level, psychologists are still debating which cognitive 
mechanisms mediate the influence of what types of nudges, and how. M&R criticize these 
three nudges for the kind of influence they allegedly exert, seeing it as a threat to our 
autonomy; it is, they claim, reason-bypassing and non-argumentative. While we reject this 
characterization as overly simplified (e.g. human reason, rationality, and argumentation are 
not confined to the slow, deliberate, linguistic, propositional, explicit, or syllogistic, and may 
not even have evolved to arrive at truth or make good decisions, but to do something more 
social, namely persuade (Mercier and Sperber 2011)), we will instead elaborate on another 
point. As the authors recognize (13), psychological details about how and how much a 
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default rule influences individual level decision-making are relevant to their argument. 
However, many of those psychological details remain murky.  
 
For instance, if the putatively autonomy-corrupting power of default rules stemmed, 
as M&R’s criticism suggests, from a lack of transparency, or from how they evaded the 
awareness or rational capacities of the decisions makers they were presented to, we should 
expect that when the presence of those rules and details about how they operate are made 
explicit in the choice architecture itself, or when choosers are pre-informed about those 
details, the effectiveness of the nudge would drop off. Even on M&R’s austere conception 
of reason, reason would be addressed rather than bypassed by such additions. However, 
Lowenstein et al (2015) report results contrary to this expectation. In a study concerning 
decisions about advanced medical directives, they show that “fuller disclosure of a nudge 
could potentially be achieved with little or no negative impact on the effectiveness of the 
intervention” (36). In other words, the effectiveness of a nudge is not a simple function of 
its bypassing reason, but is more complicated, and potentially less morally objectionable, 
even on M&R’s own terms. Obviously this study is not the last word, but it calls into 
question the quick dismissal of nudges based on simple pictures of how they engage, or fail 
to engage, certain parts of our psychology.  
 
Moral Ecology and the Sociality of Agency 
 
Beyond these more specific objections, we believe the picture of autonomy and 
agency that M&R work with represents the reductio premise from which their argument’s (to 
us) unacceptable conclusion ultimately flows. We thus end by sketching an alternative way to 
conceive of agency that is finding traction in the work of philosophers attuned to recent 
advances in empirical moral psychology, and that highlights the deeply ecological and social 
roots of human autonomy. 
 
M&R work with an “intentionally generic … conception of autonomy that 
emphasizes the role of critical or rational reflection”. This, and the rest of their discussion, 
places great emphasis and value on explicit, internal cogitation, and suggests a pristine image 
of autonomy as a state that an individual agent possesses, and realizes most fully and purely 
when she is alone, perhaps in a quiet room, undisturbed by social interactions, safely 
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protected from corrupting environmental influences. Others have marshaled evidence 
against the family of “reflectivist” views of agency associated with M&R’s reflection-based 
conception of autonomy, arguing that such views do not accurately capture how people’s 
values and preferences are expressed in their behaviors, and so would have the undesirable 
result of making instances of autonomous action and genuinely agency empirically extremely 
rare (Doris 2015). The alternatives are messier, but a range of recent empirical work 
illustrates ways in which human behavior, including moral behavior, is dialogic, and deeply 
relies on situational, environmental, cultural and social factors (Doris and Nichols 2012). 
Central to this picture are social norms, especially those that govern the practices of holding 
people morally responsible for behaviors (Washington and Kelly 2016). These help make up 
the “moral ecology,” that part of the cultural and cognitive niche that help support and 
enable action and guide exercises of responsible agency (Vargas 2013). 
 
Closer to home here, bioethicists have built the canon of autonomy on a pillar of 
individualism and on its successful expression as resistance to outside influences. However, 
work in the feminist tradition also militates against the view that ‘optimal moral reasoning’ is 
realized against social inputs, and suggests that complex moral cognition and multifaceted 
policy analysis emerge as a function of our sociality (Beever and Morar 2016). It also 
suggests that our moral judgments, our values and autonomy are typically better expressed 
when they are socially embedded. This view is built on a revised conception of human nature 
de-emphasizes the importance of explicit deliberation, but also recognizes the extent to 
which human agents themselves extend beyond biological and cognitive boundaries as 
‘distributed, hybrid-problem solving ensembles’ (Clark 2007) for whom autonomy largely 
amounts to managing, calibrating, and refining the niches in which they live. 
 
The relevant upshot of all this is that agency and autonomy are intrinsically social, 
and are often built with, and are inseparable from, interactions with others that take place in 
cultural environments and moral ecologies that we ourselves construct. We unavoidably 
operate in the midst of all sorts of environmental and social influences; as Sunstein (2014) 
puts it “Nature itself nudges; so does the weather; so do customs and traditions; so do 
spontaneous orders and invisible hands. The private sector inevitably nudges, as does the 
government” (1). These influences, we suggest, do not corrupt or compromise our agency 
and autonomy; they help create and sustain them, and navigating those influences is what 
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autonomy and agency are for. Anyway, there is no escaping them, so better to use this slowly 
dawning understanding of our selves and situation not just to distract and titillate, but to 
promote some worthwhile ends as well. 
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